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MURDER BY MOTORIST
The distinction between involuntary manslaughter and second
degree murder is at times difficult to draw in the criminal law. This is
particularly true where the death is caused by a motorist. The crimin-
al responsibility which the defendant must bear is usually involun-
tary manslaughter,' but occasionally the crime is murder.
The recent Tennessee case of Staggs v. State2 dealt with an intoxi-
cated motorist who caused the death of another. The defendant
sideswiped a car on a lonely country lane; and a board on the bed
of his truck pierced the windshield of the other vehicle, striking an
occupant therein and causing her death. The defendant was indicted
for second degree murder, and was duly tried and convicted. The
Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
A death occasioned in this manner may be either involuntary man-
slaughter or murder.3 This is the common law rule.4 It is worthwhile
considering what conduct will constitute the crime of murder.
The Tennessee theory appears to be that the intoxication of the
'Chapman v. State, 157 Fla. 463, 26 So. 2d 509 (1946); State v. Hamilton, 149
Me. 218, 1oo A.2d 234 (1953); State v. Gulke, 76 N.D. 653, 38 N.W.2d 722 (1949);
State v. Rice, 58 N.M. 205, 269 P.2d 751 (1954); State v. Martin, 164 Ohio St. 54,
128 N.E.2d 7 (1955); Commonwealth v. Smith, 178 Pa. Super. 251, 115 A.2d 782
(1955); Richardson v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 55, 63 S.E.2d 731 (1951).
In recent years, other states have introduced the crime of negligent homicide
into the criminal law where the motorist causes death. Listed are some examples of
this body of law. Duren v. State, 203 Md. 584, 102 A.2d 277 (1954) [Md. Ann. Code
art. 27, § 388 (1957)]; People v. Fedderson, 327 Mich. 213, 41 N.W.2d 527 (1950)
[Mich. Stat. Ann. § 750-324 (1948)] State v. Neri, 1o N.J. Super. 224, 76 A.2d 915
(Somerset Co. Ct. 195o) [N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:i13-9,(Supp. 1953)]; People v. Weid-
man, 281 App. Div. 1003, 12o N.Y.S.2d 592 (1953) [N.Y. Pen. Code § 1o53(a)]; State
v. Paris, 43 Wash. 2d 498, 261 P.2d 974 (1953).
2357 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1962).
'In Edwards v. State, 2o2 Tenn. 393, 304 S.W.2d 5o0, 5o2 (1957), the court said:
"A homicide of this character, generally speaking, is either involuntary man-
slaughter.., or second degree murder. .. dependent upon the facts of each par-
ticular case."
"At common law, murder is the unlawful killing of any human being with
malice aforethought, either express or implied by law ... Malice is implied by
law... by an act willfully done or a duty willfully omitted and the natural ten-
dency of the act or omission is to cause death or great bodily harm.. .. "Clark
& Marshall, Law of Crimes 561 (6th ed. 1958).
In speaking of the common law rule as applied to situations involving an
intoxicated motorist, it has been said: "Driving while intoxicated is an offense
which is malum in se. It is an act of such an unlawful and culpably negligent
character that if death results the driver is guilty of at least manslaughter. If he is
driving in a reckless and wanton manner, the resulting homicide would be
murder." 3 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure 143 (12th ed. 1957).
CASE COMMENTS
motorist is a highly relevant factor. In Edwards v. Statea the court said:
"It is inconceivable that a man can get as drunk as Edwards
was on that occasion without previously realizing that he would
get in that condition if he continued to drink. But he did con-
tinue to drink and presumably with knowledge that he was
going to drive his car back to, or close to, Lebanon over this
heavily traveled highway. He knew, of course, that such con-
duct would be directly perilous to human life. From his con-
duct in so doing, it was permissible for the jury to imply 'such
a high degree of conscious and willful recklessness as to amount
to that malignity of heart constituting malice.' "6
This is a statemnt of the common law theory of murder, where malice
is based on wanton or reckless conduct, as distinguished from purpose-
ful killing.7
From the Tennessee cases, it seems the primary factor in determin-
ing whether the crime is murder is whether the defendant was in-
toxicated.8 Tennessee has reversed a conviction where the defendant
was not intoxicated, but only speeding.9 It may be that in the original
application of the law in Tennessee an additional factor was im-
portant. The earliest case in which the accused was convicted of sec-
ond degree murder involved not only intoxication, but an element of
showing off as well.' 0 Under the more recent Tennessee cases this
factor no longer needs to be present."
South Carolina and Georgia seem to take a similar approach. In
the South Carolina case of State v. Mouzon,12 a conviction of murder
r2o2 Tenn. 393, 304 S.W.2d 500 (1957).
O1d. at 5o3.
7US. v. Freeman, 25 Fed. Cas. 12o8 (15,162) (C.C. Mass. 1827). In this case a
seaman fell to his death from the rigging of his ship. The defendant had sent him
aloft. Justice Story said that if the defendant knew or should have known such
actions might cause harm to the deceased, then "the jury can justly infer that it
must have been presisted in from personal malice to the deceased, or from such
a brutal malignity of conduct, as carries with it the plain indications of a heart
regardless of social duty, and fatally bent on mischief. If so, it was murder." Accord,
Brown v. Commonwealth, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 372, 17 S.W. 220 (891).
The court sets out the Tennessee theory: "The defendant cannot escape the
penalty of the law upon the theory that the attending circumstances of the alleged
criminal act failed to bring it within the statutory definition of murder or voluntary
manslaughter." Rogers v. State, 196 Tenn. 263, 265 S.W.2d 559, 560 (1954)-
8Stallard v. State, 2o9 Tenn. 13, 348 S.W.2d 489 (1961).
9Shorter v. State, 147 Tenn. 355, 247 S.W. 985 (1922).
20Owen v. State, 188 Tenn. 459, 221 S.W.2d 515, 519 (1949), in which the de-
fendant was trying to frighten some pedestrians, two of whom he struck and killed.
21Stallard v. State, 209 Tenn. 13, 348 S.W.2d 489 (1961); Edwards v. State,
2o.- Tenn. 393, 3o4 S.W.2d 500 (1957); Rogers v. State, 196 Tenn. 263, 265 S.W.2d
559 (1954). Accord, Ware v. State, 47 Okla. Crim. 434, 288 Pac. 374 (ig3o).
"231 S.C. 655, 99 S.E.2d 672 (1957).
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was affiimed when the defendant killed a pedestrian in a hit and run
accident, the court finding that "there is evidence of such recklessness
and wantonness as to indicate a depravity of mind and disregard of
human life...." to support the conviction. In State v. Long, 3 the Su-
preme Court of the state said: "It is gross and culpable negligence
for a drunken person to attempt to guide and operate an automobile
upon a public highway, and one so doing, and occasioning injuries
to another, causing death, may be guilty of murder or manslaughter,
as the facts may determine."' 4
Georgia has an unusual statutory structure.' 5 If the actions of an
intoxicated motorist are such as "naturally tend to destroy human life"
the offense is murder.' 6 In the case of Josey v. State,'7 the court affirmed
a conviction of murder when the defendant struck and killed a par-
ticipant in a parade, holding that the acts were reckless and wanton,
the equivalent of a specific intention to kill. Georgia, like Tennessee,
has reversed convictions of murder where only speeding was involvd.18
Reported cases from other states seem to follow a somewhat dif-
ferent standard as regards the nature of conduct necessary to estab-
lish murder. These states require some element of showing off or at-
1186 S.C. 439, 195 S.E. 624 (1938).
"Id. at 627.
'5The Georgia statutes, by interrelation of the code sections allow conviction
of murder in this instance. The theory is as follows. Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1ooi (1953)
provides: "Homicide is the killing of a human being and is of three kinds-murder,
manslaughter, and justifiable homicide."
Murder is defined in Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1oo2 (1953) as "the unlawful killing
of a human being, in the peace of the State, by a person of sound memory and
discretion, with malice aforethought, either expressed or implied." Implied malice
is then defined in Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1004 (1953) as the instance "where no con-
siderable provocation appears, and where all the circumstances of the killing show
an abandoned and malignant heart."
Finally, in Ga. Code Ann. § 26-ioo9 (1953) involuntary manslaughter is defined:
"Involuntary manslaughter shall consist in the killing of a human being without
any intention to do so, but in the commission of an unlawful act, or lawful act,
which probably might produce such a consequence, in an unlawful manner:
Provided, that where such involuntary killing shall happen in the commission of
an unlawful act which, in its consequences, naturally tends to destroy the life of
a human being, or is committed in the prosecution of a riotous intent, or of a
crime punishable by death or confinement in the penitnetiary, the offense shall be
deemed and adjudged to be murder."
"Wells v. State, 21o Ga. 422, 8o S.E.2d 153 (1954); Parke v. State, 2o4 Ga. 766,
51 S.E.2d 832 (1949); Powell v. State, 133 Ga. 398, 18 S.E.2d 678 (1942); Meadows v.
State, 186 Ga. 592, 199 S.E. 133 (1939); Jones v. State, 185 Ga. 68, 194 S.F. 216 (1937)-
197 Ga. 82, 28 S.E.2d 29o (1943). Accord, Butler v. State, 178 Ga. 700, 173 S.E.
856 (1934)-
"Huntsinger v. State, 2oo Ga. 127, 36 S.E.2d 92 (1945); Smith v. State, 2o Ga.
188, 36 S.E.2d 350 (1945).
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tempting to frighten someone to establish murder. Although the fact
situations are not always set out clearly, this seems a common ground.
In the Alabama case of Hyde v. State,19 the defendant was swerving
the car from side to side when he struck the automobile of the de-
ceased. The court held:
"If the defendant intentionally ran the car into the Austin or
acted with such conscious recklessness as defined above, then the
defendant's acts were unlawful and done without just cause or
legal excuse, which may constitute malice within the meaning
of murder in the second degree, or at least the jury could reason-
ably draw such conclusion." 20
Similarly, Alabama, in Bernes v. State,21 approved the theory of
conviction of second degree murder when the defendant swerved across
the road and killed a pedestrian, although the conviction was reversed
on a technical point. Alabama, also, has reversed a conviction of mur-
der when the defendant while speeding, although not intoxicated,
was involved in a hit and run death.
The North Carolina case of State v. Trott2 3 is one of the earliest
ones involving the factual situation of the intoxicated motorist caus-
ing death, and being convicted of murder. There the defendant, a
passenger in the car, and the driver were jointly indicted for murder
and convicted of murder in the second degree. In Trott, the intoxi-
cated defendants had passed a car parked on the side of a highway.
They turned around, and traveling at a high rate of speed, struck the
car and killed an occupant therein. The driver did not appeal, but in
affirming the conviction of the defendant as an accessoi'y the court said:
"Murder in the second degree, or murder at common law, is
the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.
Malice does not necessarily mean an actual intent to take hu-
man life. It may be inferential or implied, instead of positive,
as when an act which imports danger to another is done so
recklessly or wantonly as to manifest depravity of mind and dis-
regard of human life."24
In the later case of State v. Harvell,25 the defendant was swerving
123o Ala. App. 243, 16o So. 237 (1935).
1Id. at 238.
138 Ala. App. 1, 83 So. 2d 607, 6o9 (1953).
"Copeland v. State, 32 Ala. App. 473, 27 So. 2d 224 (1946).
'19o N.C. 674, 13o S.E. 627 (1925).
-"Id. at 629.
-2o 4 N.C. 32, 167 S.E. 459 (1933). The distinction betwen involuntary man-
slaughter and murder in North Carolina is stated in the case of State v. Stansell,
2o3 N.C. 69, 164 S.E. 58o, 581 (1932).
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